KANSAS CITY (Dow Jones)--U.S. livestock production is inherently susceptible to a terrorist attack, due to the way it is structured said a political scientist for a non-profit think tank.
"The concentrated nature of modern farming practices and the close geographic distribution of livestock production in the U.S. makes it vulnerable," said Peter Chalk, senior political scientist for the RAND Corp., at the International Symposium on Agroterrorism Tuesday.
There is little doubt an attack on U.S. livestock production could seriously hurt the farm economy, Chalk said. Livestock generates about 9.7% of the national gross domestic product and raises $50 billion annually through its exports.
The close confinement practices of U.S. agriculture in livestock production not only increases the contact animals have with each other, but it is thought to increase stress levels among the animals, which by itself increases disease susceptibility, Chalk said.
There also is a widespread lack of security and surveillance in place at production facilities, he said. Many simple items like locks and gates are lacking.
Adding to the stress level of the livestock, especially for cattle, is the long distances they travel during their lifetimes and the long distance the meat travels before reaching the consumer's plate, Chalk said. It was estimated that a pound of meat travels 1,000 miles before it is consumed, he said, and cattle travel hundreds of miles, crossing many state borders, before they reach slaughter weight.
The U.S. also has an inefficient disease-reporting system, as many illnesses go unreported, possibly circumventing the chance to head off a foreign animal disease outbreak in its earliest stages, he said.
Veterinarians are not trained to look for foreign animal diseases, Chalk said. They are trained to look for endemic diseases and to deal with the large-scale animal husbandry in the U.S.
Because of the large size of U.S. production facilities, there is no way for a farmer to know individual animals, he said. They deal with aggregate statistics and wouldn't notice the early symptoms of a single animal.
But the open nature of livestock production practices leaves many vulnerable areas, so producers must focus on risk assessment and not on vulnerability alone, he said. This will direct resources in the most efficient direction and prevent a scattered approach.
There are many lethal agents from which terrorists can choose, and many of them are very hardy and not contagious to humans, Chalk said. Handling these diseases would not require an advanced understanding of the disease.
Many diseases also spread rapidly, so there would be no need to "weaponize" it, or alter its form to make it more lethal, he said. It has been estimated, for instance, that foot-and-mouth disease could spread to 25 states in five days, given the widespread transport of many animals in the U.S.
Assessing the highest-risk areas of the livestock production system should take into account the possible motives of an attacker, Chalk said. He identified three major goals a terrorist might have.
The first is economic destabilization. This might take the form of direct losses to an industry, either through the loss of livestock, the loss of markets or the cost of control, he said.
There also could be indirect multiplier effects - the ripple effect – to various related industries. The animal feed industries would be a good example, he said.
International costs also might arise from embargoes of products and the ripple effects in other countries, he said.
Second is a loss of confidence by consumers in the safety of the food supply, Chalk said.
The general public also could lose confidence in government preparedness and control measures, destabilizing governments, he said.
Third is social instability. This motive seems most likely to Chalk, he said. Public angst arising out of animal or food attacks, particularly if deaths occur, could be crippling or fatal to an industry.
The public also might take exception to the mass culling needed to control or eradicate a disease, heightening the loss of confidence in government veterinary officials, Chalk said. There has been no modern examples of mass disease outbreaks in the U.S. during the age of television, and the outcry that arose in the UK during the height of its foot-and-mouth disease outbreak implies a similar reaction would take place here. There were graphic images of burning livestock at the time.
The good news is that terrorists generally like to use forms of aggression that provide more visible and immediate effects that have a built-in shock value, Chalk said. But agroterrorism has potential appeal as a secondary mode of attack, he said.
Source: Lester Aldrich; Dow Jones Newswires; 913-322-5179; lester.aldrich@dowjones.com